Bug #110

Open Crypto Audit Project TrueCrypt CS-TC-4 - Unauthenticated ciphertext in volume headers

Added by Jason Pyeron almost 4 years ago.

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TARGETS: TrueCrypt volume metadata stored in encrypted headers
DESCRIPTION: The TrueCrypt volume format consists of a small header containing metadata followed
by the contents of the volume. The header and volume contents are encrypted separately: the header
with a key derived from a user-supplied password, and the contents with a master key stored in the
encrypted header.
Cryptographic integrity and authenticity guarantees are beyond the scope of full-disk encryption.
This is because providing these checks would necessarily incur unacceptable storage and performance
penalties. Volume contents are accordingly encrypted without authentication.
In contrast, guaranteeing the integrity of the volume header is a tractable problem. Indeed, TrueCrypt
attempts to provide integrity by several means, including:
• A magic string ``TRUE'' at the beginning of the volume header.
• A CRC32 calculated over the master key material.
• A CRC32 calculated over the remainder of the volume header.
These checks do not constitute a true message authentication code (MAC). In a plaintext-only scenario,
it would be trivial for an attacker to forge a valid header. In practice, an attacker does not have such
fine-grained control due to the message-scrambling properties of the available encryption algorithms.
Nevertheless, existential forgeries are possible with approximately 232 queries.
The consequences of a successful header forgery are unclear. Because the header contains many fields
that drive program behavior, tampering with them may cause TrueCrypt to enter unexpected or invalid
Recommendation: Design a new system that uses the passphrase-derived user key to derive both an
encryption and an authentication key. Verify a MAC of header ciphertext before attempting decryption.

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